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Introduction 
High level U.S. political engagement during the last two months has resulted in a visible easing of 
tensions between India and Pakistan. During the visit of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
to Pakistan on 6 June 2002, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf pledged to end cross-border 
infiltration from Pakistan into Indian-controlled Kashmir on a permanent basis. India responded with a 
series of diplomatic and military steps, and acknowledged that the level of cross-border incidents had 
decreased. Pakistan, however, dismissed the steps taken by India as merely "cosmetic." During his visit 
to India on 12 June, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the United States would want 
to convert this initial positive movement into a virtuous cycle of mutually reinforcing actions that would 
reduce tensions and create the conditions for political dialogue between the two adversaries.  
When he was in the region recently, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell emphasized the need to resume 
a bilateral India-Pakistan dialogue. He pressed India to ensure free and fair elections in Kashmir, which 
he regarded as a necessary precursor to resumption of talks. Although U.S. engagement has helped 
diffuse border tension between India and Pakistan, the militaries of both countries continue to be poised 
for confrontation. It is now incumbent upon the respective leaders of India and Pakistan to maintain the 
momentum of reconciliation that can lead to a lasting peace in the region.  
Analysis 
India's leaders had adopted an offensive military posture against Pakistan in the wake of the 13 
December terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, which many believed was masterminded by Pakistan-
based terrorist organizations. The Indian government demanded that Pakistan put a stop to cross-border 
infiltration by Pakistan-based terrorists into Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India. Pakistanis in 
turn saw Indian mobilization as a challenge to their country's territorial integrity, and regarded the Indian 
demand to stop cross-border terrorism as an attempt to suppress what Islamabad claims is a legitimate 
Kashmiri independence struggle. President Musharraf soon realized, however, that his efforts to convince 
the world that the fight by a global coalition against terrorism in Afghanistan was somehow different from 
the Indian government's fight against terrorism in Kashmir had little support. Intense international 
pressure and his own desire to transform Pakistan into a modern democratic state as did his one-time 
role model Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, may have impelled Musharraf to make a historic speech on 12 
January 2002, in which he pledged not to allow terrorist activities against any country from Pakistani 
soil.[1] 
He earned accolades from world leaders for his bold stand against Islamic radicalism and generated a 
great deal of hope for lasting peace in South Asia. India also cautiously welcomed Musharraf's speech. 
The Indian government nevertheless declared that it would like to see Musharraf's words translated into 
actions. Indian skepticism apparently was directed at Musharraf's intent as well as his capability to reign 
in Pakistan's domestic hardliners. The Indian military softened its offensive posture for a short period, but 
refused to withdraw forces from the border.[2] 
The events that followed Musharraf's 12 January speech showed that Indian apprehensions were not 
entirely unfounded. By making promises to stamp out Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Musharraf seems 
to have tried to placate international opinion. He took some concrete steps such as arresting leaders of 
the Pakistan-based terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), raiding 
their administrative and training infrastructure, freezing terrorist assets worth $300,000, and asking 
Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to close their Kashmir office. As a result of these actions there 
was a perceptible decrease in cross-border infiltration into the Indian part of Kashmir during the months of 
February-April 2002. However, this trend rapidly reversed from mid-April onwards. Reports indicated that 
cross-border infiltration had increased, and 50-60 new terrorist training camps had become operational 
within Pakistan's side of Kashmir.[3] Pakistan-based terrorist leaders even threatened openly to thwart 
the election process in Indian Kashmir, which is due to begin in October 2002.[4] 
One conclusion that can be drawn from this increase is that Musharraf lacked control over Jihadi 
elements in Pakistan. The International Crisis Group (ICG) recently echoed similar views. Musharraf's 
decision in October 2001 to join the coalition against global terrorism was resented by Pakistan's radical 
Islamic organizations, which instigated street protests. Some militant organizations even sent their cadres 
to fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan.[5] The Taliban's defeat was a setback to these radical 
organizations but they showed no sign of giving up Jihad against the West.  
Despite the stringent measures taken by the Pakistani government, Jihadis managed to launch attacks 
against Western targets in Pakistan. On 17 March 2002, five people died in a suicide attack on a church 
located in the heart of Islamabad's high security zone.[6] In February 2002, members of JeM abducted 
Washington Post correspondent Daniel Pearl; despite frantic efforts by the Pakistan government to 
secure his freedom, Pearl was brutally beheaded.[7] On 7 May 2002, 14 French construction workers 
were killed in a suicide bomb attack in Karachi.[8] By indulging in such acts, Jihadis openly challenged 
Musharraf's authority. He appeared unable to cope with such blatant acts of defiance. Reports also 
suggested that renegade sections of his own establishments, i.e., the army and the ISI, were continuing 
to support Jihadi elements including those fighting against coalition forces in Afghanistan. 
By continuing to insist that terrorism in Kashmir is different from terrorism in other parts of the world, 
Musharraf raised suspicions in the international community about his commitment to the fight against 
terrorists. He was more successful in his effort to use the respectability gained from his support for the 
anti-terrorist coalition to polish his political image in Pakistan, and to strengthen his hold over the military. 
With his new image as a moderate and visionary leader to bolster him, Musharraf organized a well-
publicized referendum that extended his hold on power for five years.  
Once this questionable exercise in democracy was completed, however, Musharraf returned to his 
recalcitrant ways. He is known to be a staunch supporter of Jihad in its various manifestations, and prior 
to 11 September 2001 was a principal backer of the Taliban and Al-Qaida organizations. There are 
reports that the Pakistani government resisted allied operations in tribal areas suspected of sheltering Al-
Qaida and renegade Taliban fighters. Despite his assurances to India and the international community 
that he would not allow terrorists to operate from Pakistani soil in the name of Kashmir, Musharraf did 
permit new terrorist camps to spring up unhindered in the Pakistani part of Kashmir. On top of this, many 
of the terrorist leaders rounded up in the wake of his 12 January speech have been released.[9] 
Emboldened by these concessions, terrorists carried out a suicide attack on an Indian army camp in 
Kashmir on 14 May 2002, killing 23 people, mostly women and children who were family members of 
Indian army personnel.[9] The Indian government reacted by enhancing its military readiness to counter 
terrorist acts within its territory. To emphasize its deep resentment toward Pakistan's failure to curb cross-
border terrorism, the Indian government expelled Pakistan's high commissioner from New Delhi. The 
militaries of both countries were put on a high state of readiness for war.  
There were two immediate results of this heightened India-Pakistan tension. First, anti-terrorist operations 
in Afghanistan were hampered by the absence of effective border management by Pakistan's security 
forces, most of which were moved to Pakistan's eastern border with India. This allowed terrorists to 
escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan and lie dormant while the war continued.[10] Second, the crisis 
with India gave Islamabad a genuine excuse for reducing its military commitment to anti-terrorist 
operations in conjunction with allied forces. This reduction further served to placate domestic radicals. 
Musharraf's apparent duplicity therefore had serious implications for regional security and the U.S.-led 
war against terrorism. 
From a regional perspective, Musharraf's recalcitrant approach toward anti-Indian terrorism served to 
encourage Islamic radicals within Pakistan, and were an abrogation of his commitment to reign in 
Pakistan-based terrorists. In a televised speech on 27 May 2002, Musharraf declared that no cross-
border infiltration into Kashmir was coming from the Pakistan side. His claims of innocence are refuted by 
the fact that the allied forces operating in neighboring Afghanistan and in some parts of Pakistan were in 
a position to pick up radio intercepts originating in Pakistan that contained messages for Kashmiri 
militants. Even the Pakistani people are skeptical of such declarations by their leaders. A leading 
Pakistani economist, Akmal Hussain, wrote in Pakistan's Daily Times, "In an age when satellite cameras 
can identify the brand name of a golf ball lying on the greens of Gymkhana golf course, it is futile to 
expect the world community to accept any ambiguity on whether camps in Azad Kashmir are active or 
not."[11]  
Under the circumstances, Musharraf's claims can only have lost him credibility, without in any way helping 
his avowed Kashmir cause. He already had lost the trust of Pakistan's Islamic radicals by publicly 
supporting the anti-Taliban forces; of Pakistan's political masses by consolidating his power through a 
controversial referendum; and of his neighbor India through his covert support of Jihad in Kashmir and 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the ongoing standoff with India, even traditional friends of Pakistan in the 
Arab world preferred to adopt a neutral stance, in contrast to the pro-Pakistan position they have always 
taken in earlier India-Pakistan confrontations.[12] 
The United States and other Western governments originally applauded Musharraf's bold anti-terror 
initiatives, particularly when he joined them in the war against global terrorism. Recently, however, his 
failure to reign in domestic radical organizations, stop cross-border terrorism against India, or track down 
Al Qaida and Taliban leaders reportedly hiding in Pakistan, have damaged his image in the West. People 
in the United States and other allied countries have not forgotten images of Pakistanis burning American 
flags and truckloads of them entering Afghanistan to fight allied forces. During the pre-September 2001 
period, the Musharraf government had repeatedly said that it was not supporting Taliban and Al-Qaida. It 
is widely accepted now, however, that the Pakistani army provided military leadership to the two 
organizations, and that the ISI was actively helping them. Musharraf's unreliability and failure to follow the 
advice of his western allies could result in his further isolation and will likely prove counterproductive for 
long-term Pakistani interests.  
Musharraf's inability to control Jihadis in Pakistan has two possible explanations. He is apparently under 
pressure from within his own establishments (mainly the army and the ISI) to avoid giving in to 
international demands that he renounce Jihad in Kashmir. A leading columnist of Pakistan's Jang Group, 
Kamran Khan, writes that the Pakistani military leadership under General Musharraf is "absolutely 
confident" that the freedom struggle in Kashmir has entered a crucial phase, in which any Indian military 
adventurism along the Line of Control would trap the Indian army in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-like 
situation and hasten the granting of freedom to Kashmir's Muslims. Quoting various Pakistani officials, 
Kamran wrote that the infiltration of Jihadis into Kashmir is part of the Pakistani army's operational plans 
to trap the Indian army, if it should advance after militants into Pakistan's side of Kashmir. According to 
Pakistan's military sources, when he was Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Pakistan Army 
in the early 1990s, Musharraf developed operational plans that continue to form the core of Pakistan's 
current strategy on Kashmir.[13]  
To make things more difficult, Musharraf tends to regard India as a weak and unstable neighbor, which 
further compels him to pursue an aggressive Kashmir policy. This viewpoint is corroborated by Indian 
intelligence sources, which say that although Musharraf agreed to crack down on Jihadis under U.S. 
pressure, he continues to follow his Jihadi agenda, both to contain possible domestic violence by these 
terrorist organizations, and to maintain them as an essential instrument of his Kashmir policy. For this 
purpose he is reported to have set up new organizations like Jamat-e-milli, which is believed to have 
carried out the 14 May attack on the Indian military camp in Kashmir.[14] 
The United States and the international community have expressed serious concerns over the continuing 
military standoff between India and Pakistan. U.S. President George W. Bush and many other leaders 
persistently exhorted President Musharraf to take concrete actions against cross-border infiltration into 
India. From his recent proclamations to end the border-crossings, it is evident that he is relenting under 
international pressure. In his self-adopted role of a soldier-statesman, however, Musharraf is trying to 
maintain a precarious balance between his role as chief of Pakistan's army on the one hand and his 
position as head of state on the other. As a statesman he is required to redeem the pledges he made to 
the international community and his own people during his 12 January address. As a soldier he is 
obligated to maintain the sanctity of his own military plans. In this balancing act the all-important issue for 
Musharraf should be Pakistan's long-term well-being, which requires peace and stability in South Asia. 
His soldierly instincts have so far dictated a military solution to Pakistan's standoff with India, and hence 
Musharraf has been continuing with his Jihadi policy. Experts believe that continuation of this policy will 
be a sure recipe for regional military conflict, which is an issue of deep concern to the international 
community.  
It is too early to tell whether Musharraf's pledges to end support for terrorism represent a permanent shift 
in his Kashmir policy, or are simply opportunistic efforts to buy time. It is therefore necessary for the 
international community, led by the United States, to continue to impress upon Musharraf that the 
president as statesman will be more likely to realize his vision of a prosperous Pakistan than will the 
president as soldier. For its part, continued positive reciprocation by India will likely help Musharraf win 
over the more moderate and flexible elements within the Pakistani polity, which in turn will strengthen his 
resolve to take action against the Jihadis.  
**See the companion piece to this Strategic Insight: Pakistan's Challenges and the Need for a Balanced 
Solution by Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan** 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our South Asia Resources. 
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